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ABSTRACT 
 
“When did I, a human person, begin to exist?”  In developing an answer to this 
question, I utilize a Thomistic framework which holds that the human person is a 
composite of a biological organism and an intellective soul.  Eric Olson and 
Norman Ford both argue that the beginning of an individual human biological 
organism occurs at the moment when implantation of the zygote in the uterus 
occurs and the “primitive streak” begins to form.  Prior to this point, there does 
not exist an individual human organism, but a cluster of biological cells which 
has the potential to split and develop as one or more separate human organisms 
(identical twinning).  Ensoulment (the instantiation of a human intellective soul in 
biological matter) does not occur until the point of implantation.   
 
This conception of the beginning of human personhood has moral implications 
concerning the status of pre-implantation biological cell clusters.  A new 
understanding of the beginning of human personhood entails a new 
understanding of the morality of certain medical procedures which have a direct 
affect on these cell clusters which contain human DNA.  Such procedures 
discussed in this article are embryonic stem cell research, in vitro fertilization, 
procured abortion, and the use of abortifacient contraceptives.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 In the arena of bioethical enquiry, one of the newest and most 
controversial subjects is embryonic stem cell (ES cell) research. This research 
involves the harvesting of stem cells from human embryos.  Stem cells are “the 
primordial, largely undifferentiated cells of an organism.  ‘Totipotent’ stem cells 
are capable of forming all cells of the body.  In an early human embryo, each such 
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cell theoretically has the potential to become a human being.”1  The potential 
medical advances that such research provides would be of enormous benefit.  The 
use of harvested ES cells to grow new bodily tissues and organs for those who 
suffer from diseases requiring organ transplant could virtually eliminate the need 
for human organ donation.  Moral concerns about ES cell research arise from the 
manner in which the embryos, from which the ES cells are harvested, are 
produced.  For pro-life institutions and organizations, such as the Roman Catholic 
Church, the use of aborted human fetuses as sources of harvested ES cells is a 
clear moral wrong.  However, there is ambiguity concerning the morality of 
artificially producing human zygotes2 which are never destined to be implanted 
into a uterus; being created for the sole purpose of harvesting their ES cells. 
 In order to respond to such ambiguity, as well as that surrounding the 
moral permissibility of other biomedical procedures, I wish to enquire into the 
beginnings of human personhood.  This enquiry is different from the question 
“When does a human life begin?”  As far as human “life” per se, it is, for the most 
part, uncontroversial among the scientific and philosophical community that life 
begins at the moment when the genetic information contained in the sperm and 
ovum combine to form a genetically unique cell.  However, what is controversial 
is whether this genetically unique cell should be considered a human person.  In 
what follows, I will examine both philosophical and scientific endeavors to 
provide an answer to the question, “When did I, a human person, begin?”  The 
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answer to this question will serve as a basic premise for arguing whether the 
artificial production of embryos for the sole purpose of harvesting their ES cells, 
as well as certain other biomedical procedures,3 are morally permissible.      
 Thomas Aquinas provides a plausible foundation for building a theory of 
human personhood and its origin due to his persistent focus on the human person 
as essentially a being composed of the integrated components of intellective soul 
and material body.  Aquinas, unlike many others of his time,4 argued that one 
must consider both the body and the soul of a human being, understanding their 
interaction, in order to have a complete theory of human personhood. 
 Thus, my approach to the question of human personhood within a 
Thomistic framework will consider both biological and metaphysical aspects of 
human persons.  As Philip Smith states, “The fact that Aquinas’ metaphysics is 
grounded in the order that reason discovers in nature rather than imposes upon it, 
not only allows, but demands that the scientific information on fetal development 
be incorporated into the discussion on the beginnings of personhood.”5 
 To answer the biological aspect of the question of when human 
personhood begins, I will refer to the arguments presented by Eric Olson in his 
book, The Human Animal6 and Norman Ford in his book, When Did I Begin?7  I 
utilize these two thinkers because they, as I, approach biological data on the 
beginnings of human life with an eye to the issue of when personhood begins.  I 
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will relate the considered arguments and positions to Aquinas’ account of body 
and soul. 
THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS 
 A necessary preamble to this discussion is to present and explain the key 
relevant concepts in Aquinas’ metaphysics.  The first section concerns Aquinas’ 
understanding of the relationship between form (soul) and matter (body).  This 
section will include Aquinas’ contention that a material human body and the soul 
(form) which defines it are inseparably linked.  The second section will consider 
Aquinas’ metaphysics of ensoulment, i.e., the instantiation of a human soul in a 
human biological organism.  In the third section, I will give Aquinas’ definition of 
“person” and briefly compare it with two other conceptions of “person” from 
Peter Singer and Michael Tooley.  This metaphysical groundwork will define the 
necessary conditions to validly assert, from a Thomistic perspective, whether or 
not there is a human soul, and thus a human person, present at the earliest stages 
of biological life. 
Form and Matter 
 Thomas Aquinas held an Aristotelian view with respect to the nature of 
human persons.  The primary characteristic of this view is that a human person is 
essentially a composite unified being.  This means that the essence of human 
personhood is an integration of both of its required components: form and matter.  
Form is understood in Aristotelianism to be the defining principle by which 
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matter takes on a certain individuated nature.  Form is basically that by which an 
instance of matter possesses certain defining qualities (e.g., having a particular 
shape, size, color, texture, smell, ability to reproduce, ability to sense, ability to 
form abstract concepts, etc.) in an integrated unity.  For Aquinas and Aristotle, 
matter cannot exist without form, and form does not exist apart from matter.8  
With respect to living beings, there are three types of form and they are all 
referred to by both Aristotle9 and Aquinas10 by the term ‘soul’ (psuche and anima, 
respectively).  Soul is best characterized as the dynamic unifying principle of a 
living being’s activities and end (telos).11  There are three different types of soul:  
vegetative, sensitive, and intellective.  Each of these types is defined by its 
respective set of powers.  All three types function as the organizing principle of 
matter.    
 The vegetative soul is found in plants and all higher biological 
organisms.12  It endows them with the powers of life, nutrition, and growth.  The 
sensitive soul is found in animals and human beings.  It endows them with the 
powers of sensation, imagination, and awareness of particular objects.  The 
intellective soul is found only in human beings and is the principle of endowment 
of the powers of rational thought, as well as the human biological powers proper 
to the functioning of the intellective soul.   
 The soul is the form of the body for living beings.  It is the organizing 
principle of all physical aspects of living beings.  All types of form are essentially 
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integrated with the matter they inform.  They cannot exist separate from matter. 
Thus, the essence of human personhood requires both the form and the matter 
together; i.e., the presence of a human person requires that there be matter (a 
body) organized as an individual human body by an intellective soul (the 
appropriate form of a human person). 
 Another aspect of the Thomistic/Aristotelian relationship of form and 
matter is that form individuates matter.  Without form, there is no distinction 
between one instance of matter and another.  In fact, Aquinas contends that such 
“prime matter” (i.e., matter without form) does not exist.  All instances of matter 
are informed and each is thus a separate individual from other instances of 
informed matter.  Therefore, to say that there is an instance of informed matter is 
to say that there is an individual substance.  The body of a plant, informed by a 
vegetative soul, is distinct from the body of another plant which is informed by a 
numerically different vegetative soul.  With respect to humans, a human body 
which is informed by an intellective soul is distinct from another human body 
which is informed by a numerically distinct intellective soul. 
Metaphysics of Ensoulment13 
 Each of the three type of soul consists of a unique set of powers and these 
powers correspond to certain biological capacities and functions.  I assert that the 
relation of psychological instantiation (ensoulment) to biological instantiation is 
accomplished by matching the powers of the soul with the corresponding 
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biological capacities which the soul informs.  Aquinas argues for this position that 
the powers of the soul and biological capacities correspond to each other in the 
Summa Theologiae Ia., Q. 90, A. 4, ad. 1:  “as the soul is naturally the form of the 
body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body.”14    
 I do not intend by this to say that the biological capacities precede the 
powers of the soul.  In fact, Aquinas and Aristotle explicitly argue the reverse.  I 
merely contend that if certain powers of the soul are actualized, then the 
corresponding biological capacities will be actualized.  By modus tollens, if the 
biological capacities are not actualized, then the corresponding powers of the soul 
are not actualized. 
 When is the human soul instantiated in the matter of the biological 
organism?  In the Thomistic/Aristotelian framework, form (soul) must 
metaphysically, but not temporally, precede matter (biological organism), because 
it is the form which defines the nature of the matter.  Thus, the soul informs the 
nature of the biological organism not before, nor after, but at the same moment as 
the biological organism is instantiated.  As Philip Smith points out,  
Since [the soul] is the organizing principle of a living organism, 
the substantial form is the source of a being’s internal unity and the 
root of its specific activity and growth.  Thus, while we cannot 
directly experience this form, we can infer its reality by observing 
a being’s activity. . . .  By examining a thing’s operations, we can 
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learn something about the source of its operations or its substantial 
form.15   
To understand what kind of form (soul), informs the matter of a particular 
organism, we must observe the activities of that organism.  The presence of 
activities proper to a particular type of soul allows the inference of the presence of 
that type of soul.  
 For example, if an organism is observed to have the capacity to respirate, 
reproduce, take in nutrition, etc., it can be concluded that it is informed by a 
vegetative soul.  If an organism is observed to not only be alive, but also has the 
capacity for sensory awareness of its environment and has the proper sensory 
organs, then one can conclude that it is informed by a sensitive soul.  Finally, if an 
organism is observed to be alive, capable of sensation, and has, or is developing, 
the organs necessary for intellectual thought, then that organism can be said to be 
informed by an intellective soul -- the one type of soul that, for Aquinas, defines a 
person. 
Definition of Personhood 
 Aquinas adopts the definition of “person” that Boethius’ offers in his 
treatise Contra Eutychen et Nestorium III.  The best English translation of the 
technical definition is “individual substance of a rational nature.”16  The two key 
relevant terms are ‘individual’ and ‘rational.’  I interpret Aquinas as intending, by 
the use of these two terms, that a person must consist of one, ongoing ontology 
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and a soul which endows it with the power of rationality, i.e., intellect.  Hence, 
for Aquinas, a person is an individual, continuous biological organism informed 
by an intellective soul.   
 Included in this defintion of “person” is the contention that the mere 
presence of the intellective soul is sufficient for personhood.  The actualization of 
all of the soul’s essential powers of personhood is not necessary.  That is, the 
informed biological organism need not be actually capable of rational thought for 
it to be considered a person.  Aquinas, in this respect, differs from Peter Singer, 
who contends that personhood is not acquired until the biological organism 
actualizes the essential powers of personhood, viz., rational thought, autonomous 
choice, self-consciousness, etc.  For Aquinas, the endowment of the essential 
powers of personhood is sufficient for actual personhood.    
 Aquinas’ conception of the necessary conditions for personhood seem to 
be in agreement with Michael Tooley’s understanding of personhood.  On p. 146 
of his book Abortion and Infanticide,17 Tooley summarizes his position 
concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood.  Of the four 
essential qualities of personhood that Tooley identifies (having a non-momentary 
interest, rationality, being an agent, and self-consciousness), not one of them is 
considered by him to be a necessary condition for personhood; though, he holds 
that having a non-momentary interest and being an agent may each, in 
themselves, be a sufficient condition for personhood.  It seems as if Tooley and 
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Aquinas are in agreement that the essential qualities, or powers, of personhood 
need not be actualized for a person to be present.  Tooley and Aquinas also seem 
to be in agreement when Tooley asserts at least one necessary condition for 
personhood:  “a continuing mental substance.”18  Although Aquinas does not hold 
the human intellective soul (considered by itself) to be a “substance,” in the 
technical Aristotelian understanding of that term, he does contend that 
psychological (mental) continuity is necessary for personhood in the sense that 
there must be the continuous presence of an human intellective soul. 
 With this Thomistic metaphysical framework in mind, I will now present 
the arguments of Olson and Ford as to when the biological requirements of 
ensoulment are met.  The basic requirement is an ongoing ,ontologically unique, 
biological organism which, in its activities, exemplifies the powers of the 
intellective soul. 
OLSON AND THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 Olson holds that the continuous existence of a human biological organism 
is necessary and sufficient for personhood.  In a Thomistic framework, however, I 
contend that the continuous existence of a human biological organism is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for personhood.  As already described above, for 
Aquinas, the instantiation of an intellective soul informing the biological 
organism is also necessary for personhood.  However, while I disagree with Olson 
on this point, his arguments for the beginning of the continuous existence of a 
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human biological organism are salient, because the continuous existence of such 
is a necessary component of human personhood for Aquinas. 
 Olson argues that the beginning of a human person as an individual living 
continuous19 biological organism is  
when the cells that develop into the fetus (as opposed to the 
placenta) become specialized and begin to grow and function in a 
coordinated manner.  They develop bilateral symmetry around the 
‘primitive streak’, the ancestor of the spinal cord.  At this point, 
twinning is no longer possible: cutting away half the cells would 
not result in two smaller living embryos, but would simply cause 
death. . . . Only at this point do we have a multicellular organism 
and not merely a mass of living cells stuck together.20 
The key to Olson’s argument for the beginning of a human person not occurring 
before this point in fetal development is the totipotency of the mass of cells that 
make up the blastocyst before it becomes implanted in the uterine wall.  
“Totipotency” means that, prior to implantation, each cell or group of cells has the 
power to separate from the rest of the zygote, divide by cellular mitosis, and 
develop into a multicellular organism.  It is due to this totipotency of pre-
implantation cells that identical twins, triplets, etc., are able to occur.  One or 
more cells break away from the cluster, divide (mitosis), and develop into a 
second (or third, fourth, etc.) organism.  Since each cell or group of cells is its 
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own unique individual biological entity and has the capacity to separate and 
develop into a distinct multicellular biological organism, it cannot be said that 
there is already an individual human organism at this point.  In potentiality, there 
are, practically speaking, one or a few individual human organisms present.21 
 One could respond to this conclusion by asserting that there is one 
individual human organism in potentiality, if the case were that twinning did not 
occur.  I argue that this response fails because, before the point at which twinning 
becomes impossible, there is both the potential for a single organism and for 
multiple organisms to develop.  Neither potentiality is any more potential, or 
closer to being actual, than the other.  In other words, any zygote has the potential 
to twin, prior to implantation. One may argue that one of the potentialities would 
have an advantage over the other if there were some type of genetic encoding for 
twinning that determines whether or not it will occur.  However, at the present 
time of scientific discovery, it is not known whether such is the case or not.  
FORD AND THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 Olson builds his case upon the work done by Norman Ford in his book, 
When did I Begin?  I will give a brief outline of Ford’s arguments against the 
human individual beginning prior to implantation and the formation of the 
“primitive streak.”22  Then, I will relate Ford’s (and Olson’s) conclusion to 
Aquinas’ metaphysical account of ensoulment. 
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 Ford begins with the argument in favor of the human individual beginning 
at the moment of fertilization.23  The basic case being made is that there is strong 
biological evidence that an ontologically and genetically unique individual human 
organism begins a career of biological development at the moment of 
fertilization.24  Ford counters that, at the moment of fertilization, there is only a 
genetically distinct biological entity, not an ongoing ontologically distinct entity:   
Biologists speak about one’s genetic or biological identity or 
genome being established at fertilization.  This is unique for each 
individual.  Except in the case of identical twins, no two persons 
have the same genetic constitution or genotype. . . . [But] the 
genetic code in the zygote does not suffice to constitute or define a 
human individual in an ontological sense.  Identical twins have the 
same genetic code but they are distinct ontological individuals.25     
The first cell which results after fertilization is complete has a unique genetic 
identity and a unique ontological identity as a biological cell.  However, it does 
not have a unique ontological identity as a human being.  This is due to there 
existing, after the first mitotic event, two cells which have the same genetic 
identity, but are ontologically distinct.  The same follows for every event of 
cellular mitosis until the point is reached when mitosis can no longer occur which 
results in ontologically distinct beings, i.e., identical twinning is no longer 
possible.   
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 One could counter that twinning does not lead to the conclusion that there 
is not an ontologically unique individual to begin with, if it were the case that the 
second (twin) ontological individual grows out of the material of the first without 
the first losing its ontological status.  I contend, however, that this does not seem 
to be a likely case since there is no way to differentiate the two different 
ontologies.  Cells remain undetermined for quite some time as to where they will 
go and what role they will play in the developing organism.  The same 
indeterminism can come into play in some cases of twinning in which the two 
organisms share cell clusters for a great deal of the developmental process.26  To 
which organism each set of cells will ultimately go is largely undetermined.  
Therefore, there is both a sharing of ontology and a lack of completely 
individuated ontology in each organism.27  
 There is another important implication of the indeterminacy factor for the 
cells of the zygote.  A great number of the zygote’s cells, when they become 
differentiated from other cells, are utilized to form extraembryonic material 
(trophoblast).28  These cells do not contribute to the “embryo proper.”  Only the 
cells in the ICM (Inner Cell Mass) are differentiated from those that form the 
trophoblast to form the embryo itself.  Furthermore, there is no strict determiner 
for which cells will form the trophoblast and which will form the ICM.  Ford 
points out that it is just a matter of which cells are spatially located in relation to 
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other cells and the outer membrane (zona pellucida) that places different cells into 
one of the two sets.   
 The stage at which this differentiation has occurred is called the morula 
stage.  Ford argues that, as I indicated above,  
at the morula stage, it is extremely difficult to establish the 
presence of the sort of unity that would be required for the cluster 
of cells to be an actual ontological individual.  There does not 
appear to be any strict commitment or rigid predetermination in 
cells from the earliest cleavages to become the inner cells. . . . The 
relatively independent behaviour of the individual cells, together 
with the indeterminate and uncommitted nature of their 
developmental potential within the cluster of cells as a whole, 
seems to be incompatible with the individuation of the morula 
itself as a distinct ontological individual.29    
 In a separate article, Ford contends that “it is only at the primitive streak 
stage that specific cells are destined to form the entire embryo and fetus.  This 
means that the cells within the zona pellucida are not yet sufficiently activated to 
form one integrated living body.” 30 Based on experiments conducted that resulted 
in chimeric sheep (i.e., a sheep formed out of “the cells of genetically dissimilar 
embryos”), Ford concludes “that purposeful development [from a zygote to an 
embryo] occurs between cells rather than within a multicellular individual.”31  
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 However, the question now arises that once the cells have differentiated at 
the end of the morula stage into the trophoblast and ICM, could it be said that the 
ICM constitutes an ongoing ontologically unique individual?  Ford states that 
there is still indeterminate differentiation that occurs as the zygote implants itself 
in the uterine wall.32  Some of the cells of the ICM, formed before implantation, 
will not, in the end, form part of the embryo proper, but will form extraembryonic 
material.33  Thus, it still cannot be said that there is a unique individual entity until 
all the cells which will contribute to the formation of the embryo proper are 
determined to that end and no other.  Prior to strict cell determination, there are 
more than one entity present in the zygote, embryo proper and extraembryonic 
material, and they are not able to be completely differentiated from each other.   
 Another way of approaching this issue is to argue that the entire “new 
biological entity”34 is the human organism.  Couldn’t it be said that the embryo 
proper, placenta, umbilical cord, and any other extraembryonic biological material 
together constitute one unique human organism?  If this is the case, then the 
human organism, at the moment of birth, removes a significant portion of itself 
(the embryo proper) from the placenta, and, after a time, completely sheds the 
placenta and umbilical cord which are no longer necessary.35  
 Ford, however, rejects this possible scenario because he sees no reason for 
considering the placenta as a part of the embryo proper that is discarded after 
birth.  He cites two supporting reasons: 1. When a baby is still-born, we do not 
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mourn for the placenta and bury it along with the rest of the baby; 2. In some non-
human mammals, a placenta will form even in cases where no embryo is present.  
Thus, the placenta is best considered as a separate biological entity from the 
embryo proper.  It is the embryo proper alone that will continue to develop into an 
infant and adult human being. 
 Now, I will present Ford’s argument for when the human person does 
begin36 and will follow with a Thomistic account, compatible with Ford, of the 
event of ensoulment.37  According to current biological data, fourteen to nineteen 
days after fertilization, the new biological entity has completed the implantation 
process in the uterine wall.  By this point, all cells are determined as to whether 
they will form part of the embryo proper or extraembryonic material.  The key 
event which occurs next is the formation of the primitive streak and the beginning 
of the functioning fetal heart.  This indicates the presence of a new unique self-
sustaining human individual that will grow and develop into an infant and adult 
human being which are numerically identical to it.  Furthermore, twinning is no 
longer possible after the formation of the primitive streak.  The last possible 
occurrence of twinning is if two primitive streaks are formed.   
 Ford sums up his position and refers to ensoulment for the first time: 
The appearance of the primitive streak is an important landmark, 
indicating the position of the embryo proper with the main features 
of the new individual’s body plan.  This appears to be the stage of 
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development when the cells of the epiblast first become organized 
through this primitive streak into one whole multicellular 
individual living human being, possessing for the first time a body 
axis and bilateral symmetry.  Its developing cells are now 
integrated and subordinated to form a single heterogeneous 
organic body that endures with its own ontological as well as 
biological identity through all its subsequent stages of growth and 
development.  A new human individual begins once the matter of 
the epiblastic cells become one living body, informed or actuated 
by a human form, life-principle or soul that arises through the 
creative power of God.  The appearance of one primitive streak 
signals that only one embryo proper and human individual has 
been formed and begun to exist.  Prior to this stage it would be 
pointless to speak about the presence of a true human being in an 
ontological sense.  A human individual could scarcely exist before 
a definitive human body is formed.  As mentioned earlier, the 
formation of an ontological individual with a truly human nature 
and rational ensoulment must coincide.38    
While Ford’s insistence on a “definitive human body” here may seem arbitrary, I 
hold that it is precisely what is required in a Thomistic framework.  For Aquinas, 
in order to say that there is a human person, there must, at minimum, be an 
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intellective soul informing a human body.  The minimum requirements of a 
“definitive human body” are what is at issue in Ford’s discussion and this article.  
The answer is that a definitive human body exists when there is biological 
material present that will, in the absence of interruption in the natural course, 
develop into an adult human biological organism and nothing else.  As Ford 
argues, before the formation of the primitive streak, there is biological material 
that will naturally form things other than an adult human biological organism, 
e.g., extraembryonic material or a possible second adult human biological 
organism.   
 The presence of such material that does not belong to the embryo proper 
may prima facie not seem like a threat to the metaphysical argument that there is 
a “definitive” embryonic human body present amidst the extra material.  One may 
argue that the inability to differentiate which cells of the zygote will constitute 
extraembryonic material and which will constitute the embryo proper is merely an 
epistemological problem and has no bearing on the metaphysical reality that there 
is a definitive human body present within the cell cluster.  I disagree with such an 
argument, because the epistemological problem of differentiating which cells will 
constitute which entity (embryo proper, twin embryo, or extraembryonic material) 
is due to the lack of a metaphysical determining factor for cell differentiation.  
Contra what my interlocutor may argue, there is no metaphysical fact-of-the-
matter concerning which cells constitute the embryo proper which is merely not 
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known, or knowable, by current scientific understanding.  The only metaphysical 
fact-of-the-matter concerning the differentiation of pre-implantation cells is that 
they are not differentiated in any way.  It is merely due to chance occurrence that 
some cells, rather than others, will end up in the proper position to be cells of the 
embryo proper.39  There is no hidden metaphysical mechanism of cell 
determination present in the zygote.   
 Accepting Ford’s and Olson’s accounts of when occurs the instantiation of 
a unique individual human biological organism which will maintain biological 
continuity across its development into an infant and adult, my final concern is to 
relate this biological answer to a psychological answer to the question of when 
personhood begins.  I have argued above that, for a Thomist, a complete account 
of personhood must include both the biological and psychological factors that 
constitute a human person.  The soul is the set of endowments and powers which 
actualize the biological and psychological activities that constitute the human 
body and intellect. 
THOMISTIC ANSWER TO WHEN ENSOULMENT OCCURS 
 According to Ford and Olson, the human soul is instantiated at the end of 
implantation when the primitive streak begins to form.  It is only at this point that 
the activities proper to the human intellective soul are observed.40  However, it is 
not necessary to say that all of the soul’s powers must be actualized at that 
moment.  The actualization of the soul’s different powers occurs as the 
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corresponding biological capacities develop.  Another reason that it is not until 
the point of implantation that there can be said to be instantiation of the 
intellective soul is due to the requirement that there be individuated matter 
present.  Prior to implantation, the cluster of cells do not form a unique individual 
entity.  Rather, they are a collection of several individual entities.  Because of the 
remaining possibility of twinning, there cannot be said to be one individual 
instance of matter, i.e., one body.  There are possibly two or more bodies present.  
Therefore, it cannot be said that there is one intellective soul informing the matter 
of the zygote.  Once implantation occurs, twinning is no longer possible, and cell 
differentiation between the embryo proper and extraembryonic material is 
complete, the instance of matter that is the embryo proper can be said to be an 
individual instance of matter, informed by one form, viz., the intellective soul. 
 At the formation of the primitive streak, there is a living biological 
organism, capable of nutrition and growth,41 developing the earliest biological 
tools necessary for sensation, imagination, and rational thought (being that all of 
these powers are tied to the brain and spinal cord that develop from the primitive 
streak).  Therefore, at this point, the powers proper to the vegetative type of soul 
are actualized (life, nutrition, growth) and the powers proper to the sensitive type 
of soul are informing the biological organism to develop the tools necessary to 
actualize the powers of sensation and imagination.  Also, the powers proper to the 
intellective type of soul are informing the same development in order to actualize 
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the power of rational thought.42  The specific powers of sensation and intellection 
are not themselves actualized until the required organs begin to function.  
However, the soul itself is active by informing the body to develop the required 
organs.  Therefore, I conclude that the human person is instantiated as an 
individual complete biological organism with the powers of life, sensation, and 
rational thought (i.e., a being with both a body and a human intellective soul) at 
the moment the primitive streak begins to form, division of the organism (i.e., 
twinning) is no longer possible, and cells which form the embryo proper are 
determined to that end and no other. 
 I wish to note here, as Smith does on p. 206 of his article, that the point of 
implantation is merely used as the reference point for when the primitive streak 
begins to form and twinning is no longer possible.  There is no apparent causal 
influence of the event of uterine implantation over the possibility of twinning.  
Twinning is the key to determining an embryo’s being an individual substance 
informed by an intellective soul.  Therefore, if it were discovered that twinning 
was still possible after implantation, say up until the second trimester; then, my 
argument would be that there is no intellective soul, or human person, present 
until the second trimester.  Such a contention would present a problem of 
reconciling the lack of an intellective soul with the formation of the primitive 
streak, which would still occur at implantation and is an activity proper, I have 
argued above, to the intellective soul.  However, the fact-of-the-matter is that 
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twinning is not possible after implantation and this corresponds to the formation 
of the primitive streak.  That these two key events coincide is supporting evidence 
that both events are due to the fact that it is at this point that the intellective soul is 
instantiated in the embryonic matter. 
The Nature of the Zygote 
 One matter I must now address concerns the nature of the zygote.  Before 
there exists the developing individual biological organism, there exists, in its 
place, a cluster of cells, dividing and differentiating among themselves, which 
contain human DNA.  Based on the evidence and arguments presented above, I 
contend that this cell cluster can best be understood as human biological material, 
but not a unified living human organism.  There is no soul informing this cluster 
of cells which constitute the zygote.  It is merely biological material which 
contains human DNA.  One reason I make this contention is that each cell of the 
cluster does not exist as an self-sutaining biological organism.  Although each cell 
operates independently of the other cells in the cluster (and has the capacity to be 
separated from the other cells, divide, and form a new cell cluster), it is not a 
viable biological organism operating under its own internal life-principle 
(vegetative soul).  If that were the case, then the cell would be able to take in 
nourishment and sustain its own existence as single-celled amoebae have the 
capacity to do.  However, this is not the case.  Removed from the special 
environment provided by the different components of the female reproductive 
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system, these cells would not be capable of sustaining their own existence and 
would quickly die.43 
 In adopting this stance toward the nature of the zygote, I am departing 
from strict Thomistic embryology.  However, this departure is necessary and 
justified because Aquinas did not have the benefit of the embryological data 
available today.  Aquinas44 contends that there is a vegetative soul informing the 
zygote from the moment of conception.  However, this vegetative soul is not 
numerically identical to the set of vegetative powers of the intellective soul; i.e., 
Aquinas contends that there is no intellective soul present at this point.  Aquinas 
holds that this vegetative soul is later annihilated and replaced by a sensitive soul 
which includes both vegetative and sensitive powers.  This soul is later 
annihilated and replaced by the intellective soul which includes vegetative, 
sensitive and intellective powers.  As one can see, I could maintain allegiance to 
Aquinas’ view and still hold the thesis that the zygote does not contain an 
intellective soul.  However, holding that there is a vegetative soul informing the 
zygote implies that it is a unified living organism.  This is inconsistent with the 
arguments of Ford and Olson, which have led to the conclusion that there is not a 
unified organism extant before implantation.  Therefore, having adopted Ford and 
Olson’s position, I must depart from Aquinas on this issue.  
Two Types of Potentiality 
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 At this point, I must pause to introduce a technical distinction in Thomistic 
metaphysics: the distinction between a passive potentiality and an active 
potentiality.  This is best illustrated by example.  Every time a heterosexual 
couple engage in genital sexual intercourse without the interference of any natural 
or artificial contraceptives, each ejaculated sperm has the potential to fertilize an 
ovum, if present, and cause a new biological entity to begin to form.  This is an 
example of a passive potentiality, and the entity which can be figuratively said to 
exist in this fashion is far removed from the actualized biological organism which 
possesses an intellective soul and is on the developmental path toward full 
actualization of the essential powers of human personhood.   
 Here is another illustrative example.  If I am sitting at home watching TV, 
I have the potential to get up and walk to the store.  But, if I am already walking 
down the street in the direction of the store with the intention to complete my 
journey to the store, that is a different type of potentiality (one much closer to 
actualization).  This latter type of potentiality is an active potentiality; as opposed 
to a passive potentiality. 
 The term ‘passive’ is used because the actualization of the relevant 
capacities requires an extra component (what Tooley terms a “positive causal 
factor”)45 to act upon the subject so that the subject may actualize its relevant 
capacities.  In the case of the sperm, its potential for actualizing a new human 
person depends upon the presence of an ovum to act upon it with its set of 
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chromosomes.  In the case of my walking to the store, while I am sitting in my 
chair, an extra component, viz., a decision to get up and go the store, is required 
for me to actually get up and go to the store.  However, if I am already walking to 
the store, then this decision is already present.  Only an additional component, 
e.g., my deciding not to finish walking to the store or some barricade blocking me 
from getting to the store (what Tooley terms a “negative causal factor”),46 can 
prevent my potential for completing my journey to the store from being 
actualized. 
 With these distinctions in mind, I assert that a sperm or ovum which exists 
independently of the other only has a passive potentiality for human personhood.  
I further contend that a fertilized zygote also has only a passive potentiality for 
human personhood, which implies that it is not yet an actual person.  Why?  
Because, in addition to unique genetic identity (which the zygote does possess), 
ongoing ontological identity is required (which the zygote does not possess since 
it is capable of twinning into two or more distinct ontologies); and the latter is 
only achieved by the addition of another positive causal factor, viz., the 
intellective soul.47   
 Therefore, until the moment when twinning is no longer possible, there is 
no actual human person present, because there is no basis for contending that 
there is a human soul informing the matter of the zygote.  Nevertheless, it seems 
counter-intuitive to assert that both a sperm cell and a fertilized zygote share the 
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same type of potentiality.  One tends to think that there is an important difference 
between the two types of biological material, even though they both require the 
addition of a key positive causal factor to become a unified human biological 
organism.   
 Tooley offers a solution to this dilemma by recognizing that there is a 
range of passive potentiality.  Two things may both have only a passive 
potentiality to be something else, but one of the two may be closer to actualizing 
that potentiality than the other.  How?  One may have a need of fewer positive 
causal factors to fulfill its potentiality.  In this case, the sperm first requires union 
with an ovum, and then instantiation of an intellective soul, to fulfill its 
potentialty for human personhood.  The fertilized zygote has already achieved 
union with an ovum, it requires only the instantiation of the intellective soul to 
fulfill its potentiality.  Thus, it could be contended, in agreement with the general 
intuition, that the fertilized zygote is, to a large degree, closer to being an actual 
human person than the sperm cell is.  In fact, one could say that, since the zygote 
has the requisite DNA programming, it has an active potentiality for further 
biological development toward becoming the individual human biological 
organism which is informed by the intellective soul.  However, it would still have 
only a passive potentiality for human personhood -- since it requires the 
additional positive causal factor, viz., the intellective soul. 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
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 I will now proceed to address the ethical implications that follow from the 
conception of a zygote as having merely a passive potentiality for personhood.  I 
wish to first note that, while the zygote is not a human person, it is still human in 
the sense that it contains a complete set of human DNA.  Thus, as stated above, it 
could be said that the zygote, while having only a passive potentiality for 
personhood, has an active potentiality for biological development toward 
becoming a human biological organism which is informed by an intellective soul.  
Due to this active potentiality for human biological development, I contend that 
the zygote should not be treated frivolously.48 Nothing should interfere with the 
natural process of cell mitosis and differentiation unless it has a commensurate 
value.  Defining what outcomes would be of commensurate value is a separate 
and daunting task.  I follow with a couple examples of morally contentious acts 
which may have a commensurate value to the that of the zygote. 
ES cell Research 
 Richard Doerflinger, the associate director of the pro-life activities office 
of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), has suggested that 
“supposing that the laboratory-produced stem-cell clusters are not true human 
embryos but only resemble them . . . the research could go forward.”49  
Doerflinger and the NCCB may contend that the human zygotes produced in vitro 
for the purpose of ES cell harvesting are indeed truly human by re-asserting the 
Roman Catholic Church’s claim that inviolable human life begins at the 
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completion of the process of conception.  My argument, however, is that even if 
such laboratory-produced zygotes do contain human DNA in the cells that 
constitute the cluster, that is not sufficient for claiming that there is either an 
actual human person present, or a potential human person present -- “potential” in 
the sense of an active potentiality.  Such laboratory-produced ES cell clusters 
would resemble a human person only in terms of being potential persons in the 
sense of a passive potentiality.    
In Vitro Fertilization 
 Allowing a woman to conceive and bear children of her own and her 
partner’s genetic makeup is a good thing.  However, the process of in vitro 
fertilization and implantation of zygotes into the uterus, by which a woman who 
would otherwise be unable to conceive children of her own can do so, has the 
consequence of allowing the destruction of a small number of fertilized zygotes.50  
But, if the above thesis is true, then there has been no loss of human life.  What 
was destroyed in this process was human biological material which was not 
informed by an intellective soul.  Such zygotes have none of the endowments 
associated with the intellective soul, even in active potentiality.  At most, they are 
potentially (in the sense of passive potentiality) the recipients of an intellective 
soul -- nothing more.     
 Furthermore, we can take into account the scientific evidence that a 
number of fertilized zygotes do not implant in the uterus following conception.  
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The result is a natural (spontaneous) abortion.  Since this is the case, it seems odd 
to believe that God (or whatever agent is responsible for creation) would permit 
the needless death of so many persons.  It seems more reasonable to conceive of 
them as naturally rejected biological material -- not persons. 
Procured Abortion and Abortifacient Contraceptives 
 With respect to the abortion issue, my thesis is not practically applicable 
since procured abortions cannot occur until after the mother is aware that she is 
pregnant.  Usually, implantation and the instantiation of an intellective soul have 
occurred by that point.  However, my thesis could be used to argue in favor of the 
use of certain artificial contraceptives that are morally rejected otherwise.  Some 
people accept the moral permissibility of using artificial contraceptives such as 
condoms or spermicidal jelly, but object to the use of an IUD or the “morning-
after” pill, because they function as abortifacients, i.e., they cause spontaneous 
abortions.51  According to my thesis, for such people, artificial contraceptives 
which function as abortifacients would be morally permissible, if the 
contraceptives are utilized to achieve an end of commensurate value; for the 
spontaneous abortion occurs before the implantation process begins, 
 An example of a case in which there may be justifiable use of such 
contraceptives involves a schizophrenic woman who is on medication (e.g., 
haldol) which would likely lead to severe limb malformation of the fetus if she 
should become pregnant.  In this case, it seems better that she not become 
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pregnant.  Therefore, the use of abortifacient contraceptives (which have a higher 
success rate of preventing pregnancy than other contraceptives, such as condoms) 
may be justified considering that preventing the birth of a severely physically 
deformed child is commensurate with the loss of a zygote which has only a 
passive potentiality for becoming a human person. 
CONCLUSION  
 As is apparent, this combination of scientific discovery and philosophical 
reflection does not provide a definitive answer to the issue of the beginning of 
human personhood and the moral implications thereof.  However, a plausible and 
coherent Thomsitic conception of human personhood and its origins sheds light 
upon the critical subject of morally evaluating certain relevant actions under a 
natural law, deontological, or utilitarian ethical system.52    
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